Abstract: As Grice defined it, a speaker conversationally implicates that p only if the speaker expects the hearer to recognize that the speaker thinks that p. This paper argues that in the sorts of cases that Grice took as paradigmatic examples of conversational implicature there is in fact no need for the hearer to consider what the speaker might thus have in mind. Instead, the hearer might simply make an inference from what the speaker literally says and the situation in which the utterance takes place. In addition, a number of sources of the illusion of conversational implicatures in Grice's sense are identified and diagnosed.
INTRODUCTION
In one of Grice's examples of conversational implicature, a motorist has run out of gasoline and is approached by a passerby who informs him, "There is a gas station around the corner". As Grice understands the case, the motorist will ask himself what the passerby must have had in mind and, presuming that the passerby is speaking cooperatively, will conclude that the passerby must have had in mind that the gas station is open and has gas to sell. Assuming that the passerby did indeed have that in mind and expected the motorist to recognize that fact in this way, the passerby can be said to have conversationally implicated that the gas station is open and has gas to sell. In general, a speaker conversationally implicates that p only if the speaker expects that the hearer will recognize that the speaker thinks that p.
However, there is another way to explain the transaction between the motorist and the passerby. The motorist, we may suppose, accepts what the passerby literally says as true: there is a gas station around the corner. Further, the motorist observes that they are at a busy intersection in the middle of the day; so any gas station around the corner is likely to be open and have gas to sell. Hence the motorist infers that he can buy gas at the gas speaker thinks) that it is within the competence of the hearer to work out, or grasp intuitively, that the supposition mentioned in (2) is required. (1989, (30) (31) Although in clause (2) of this definition Grice writes of what is necessary to ensure consistency with the Cooperative Principle, Grice cannot mean here only logical consistency. Presumably Grice's intent in (2) is that the assumption that the speaker thinks that q is somehow supposed to explain the speaker's conformity to the Cooperative Principle, that is, show us that the speaker can be considered as conforming to the Cooperative Principle.
Also, although in clause (3) the speaker is only supposed to think it within the competence of the hearer to work out that (2) holds, Grice has to hold also that the speaker conversationally implicates q only if the speaker expects the hearer to recognize that (2) does hold. This is evident from the parenthetical remark in (3). The hearer would not think that the speaker would think it within the competence of the hearer to recognize that (2) holds unless the hearer did recognize that (2) holds. So the speaker would not think that the hearer would think that the speaker thinks that it is within the competence of the hearer to recognize that (2) holds unless the speaker expected the hearer to recognize that (2) does hold. That the speaker has to expect the hearer to recognize that (2) holds is confirmed also in Grice's account of the thought process by which the hearer works out the presence of a conversational implicature, according to which the hearer is to think (in part):
"… he could not be [observing the maxims of the Cooperative Principle] unless he thought that q; [and] he knows (and knows that I know that he knows) that I can see that the supposition that q is required" (1989, 31) .
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Thus, the definition of conversational implicature might be more plainly formulated as follows:
A speaker conversationally implicates that q by saying that p if and only if he or she implicates that q, and (1) he or she may be presumed to be conforming to the Cooperative Principle in saying that p, and (2) the explanation of his or her conformity to the Cooperative Principle is that he or she thinks that q, and (3) he or she thinks that the hearer will recognize that it is his or her thinking that q that explains his or her conformity to the Cooperative Principle.
Where there is a conversational implicature that q, there exists in the speaker the thought that q, and the presence of this thought explains the presumed cooperativeness of what the speaker explicitly says, and the speaker thinks the hearer can recognize this. Of course,
Grice did not mean that the speaker has to intend that the hearer contemplates the Cooperative Principle as such, but only that the speaker has to intend that the hearer will recognize that the speaker's thinking that q shows that the speaker's words have some feature that we theorists can recognize as one required by the Cooperative Principle.
In defining conversational implicature in this way, we are presuming that present purposes we may safely lump them together.
As Grice defined conversational implicature, a speaker's conversational implicatures are in some respects independent of the speaker's expectations and intentions.
In particular, the satisfaction of condition (2) is not simply a matter of what the speaker expects or intends. Though a speaker expects the hearer to think that the speaker thinks that q and intends thereby to conversationally implicate that q, the speaker may fail to conversationally implicate that q if in fact the supposition that the speaker thinks that q is not necessary in order to explain the speaker's conformity to the Cooperative Principle. In some cases, there may be many ways of interpreting the speaker as conforming to the Cooperative Principle, and in that case the speaker will simply fail to conversationally implicate that q even if he or she intends to do so. One might try to improve on Grice's definition by treating the proposition conversationally implicated as singled out in some other way than simply by being that which the speaker must have in mind given that the speaker is presumed to be speaking cooperatively. In that case, this further specification of the proposition conversationally implicated might appeal to the speaker's expectations and intentions, but it is not obvious that it would have to do so.
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In principle one might put forward a definition of conversational implicature on which the presence of a conversational implicature is even more independent of the speaker's expectations and intentions than it is on Grice's definition. One might require not only, as in condition (3), that the speaker think that the hearer will recognize that it is his or her thinking that q that explains his or her conformity to the Cooperative Principle, but also that this thought be reasonable. One might even go so far as to substitute the following more externalistic condition in place of Grice's own condition (3):
(3 ext ) The hearer will in fact recognize that it is the speaker's thinking that q that explains the speaker's conformity to the Cooperative Principle.
That is, one might stipulate that there is a conversational implicature only where there is actual uptake on the part of the hearer. It will be useful to distinguish between Grice's own definition of conversational implicature and this more externalistic conception of conversational implicature, with (3 ext ) in place of (3), because, as I will explain more fully below, my critique will pertain first of all to the externalistic conception and will pertain to Grice's own conception only by extension. Doubts about the existence of conversational implicature externalistically conceived will extend to conversational implicature as Grice conceived of it because if successful communication does not depend on the hearer's recognizing that the speaker is thinking that q, then surely it also does not depend on the speaker's intending that the hearer recognize that the speaker is thinking that q.
SUCCESSFUL COMMUNICATION
As I will explain more fully in the next section, the question I wish to raise is whether it is necessary to posit conversational implicatures, as Grice defined them, in order to understand ordinary, noncontrived cases of successful linguistic communication.
Accordingly, we will need at least some vague conception of successful linguistic communication that does not immediately commit us to the conclusion that it is. Even if we defined successful linguistic communication in such a way that conversational implicature A counterexample to the definition in terms of goals would be a case in which a person uses language to achieve a goal but in which it is irrelevant that the noises he or she makes belong to language (such as shouting "Get away!" to scare away a raccoon). In another, more difficult sort of counterexample the linguistic character of the noises is relevant but the speaker's goal is achieved in the wrong way. For example, suppose A and B both have it as their objective to find out which of two movies the other prefers to see and then to go with the other to see that one. Suppose A says, "So you don't want to see This is a bit too strong since two people might contrive a situation in which the first promises to conform to the Cooperative Principle and the second has to guess what the first must have in mind given that the first is doing so and the first predicts that the second will be able to do this. So conversational implicatures are at least possible and may have actually occurred. A lower bound would be simply the thesis that some of the examples of conversational exchange that Grice or others have thought of as exhibiting conversational implicature fail to do so. More than that, I want to say that the paradigmatic cases fail to be so; and even more than that, I want to say that the concept of conversational implicature is not a useful concept in the theory of language.
My way of striking a middle ground will be to formulate my claim as the thesis that the concept of conversational implicature has no role to play in our understanding of normal Again, the central target of my critique is the idea that normally when the success of communication depends on the hearer's grasping some content over and above that which the speaker literally expresses, the hearer has to recognize that the speaker has a thought with that content; so I should stress here at the start that it really is essential to Grice's conception that in grasping a conversational implicature hearers must do this. One might think that, regardless of what Grice himself said, a useful notion of conversational implicature might remain if, in place of (3) and its externalistic variant, we substituted a condition merely to the effect that the hearer ought to be able to recognize that it is the speaker's thinking that q that explains the speaker's conformity to the Cooperative Principle or a condition to the effect that, as Grice himself puts it, it is within the competence of the hearer to grasp that it is the speaker's thinking that q that explains his or her conformity to the Cooperative Principle. But even if we made these moves, we could not maintain that the concept of conversational implicature had a role to play in the explanation of linguistic communication unless we supposed that in many typical cases hearers do that which, on these proposals, they ought to be able to do or have it within in their competence to do, and that means contemplating whether the speaker has in mind that q, where the proposition that q is that which the speaker is supposed to be conversationally implicating. My arguments should equally cast doubt on any such thesis. Like Grice, Sperber and Wilson (1987, 1995) think of communication as a matter of speakers intending to convey certain propositions and hearers grasping those intentions.
What they call ostensive-inferential communication is characterized by an informative intention, which, in their terminology, is the intention to make certain assumptions manifest to the hearer, and a communicative intention, which is the intention to make it mutually manifest between the hearer and the speaker that the speaker has this informative intention (1995, (50) (51) (52) (53) (54) (55) (56) (57) (58) (59) (60) (61) (62) (63) (64) . They state flatly: "We see verbal communication as involving a speaker producing an utterance as a public interpretation of one of her thoughts, and the hearer constructing a mental interpretation of this utterance, and hence of the original thought" (1995, 230) . Their difference with Grice concerns primarily the manner in which hearers are supposed to arrive at an interpretation. Rather than make inferences from Grice's Cooperative Principle, with its various submaxims, hearers are supposed to arrive at an interpretation by assuming that the correct interpretation is "consistent" with "the principle of relevance" (pp. 167 ff.), where the principle of relevance states that "every act of ostensive communication communicates a presumption of its own optimal relevance" Conversational Implicature 6/5/00 Page 14 (158), and the presumption of optimal relevance, in turn, is basically the presumption that the assumptions that the speaker intends to make manifest will be optimally relevant to the hearer (1995, 158) . define a special class of meanings, beyond literal meanings, will be discussed in section 5 below.) As I have explained, my thesis is just slightly weaker than the thesis that conversational implicatures simply do not exist.
EXAMPLES
Three purported examples of conversational implicatures from Grice's "Logic and
Conversation" (reprinted in Grice 1989) will now be discussed in detail. In each case, we will find that there is no need to suppose that clause (3) of the definition of conversational implicature is satisfied. We will find that given a plausible account of the objectives of the conversation, we can account for the success of the conversation without supposing that do not claim that everything that has ever been thought of as Gricean conversational implicature is subject to specifically similar criticisms. My view is that the phenomena that have been called conversational implicature bear various similarities and differences to one
another, but there is nothing that unites them and distinguishes them from other things.
(For instance, the sorts of cases that Davis identifies as involving a conventional element may require a different treatment.) But the cases I will consider here are the paradigms, and so if my critique of these is successful, it will not be too much of an exaggeration to claim, as I have, that the concept of conversational implicature is entirely dispensable in this way.
THE PETROL EXAMPLE
Consider again the example with which I began. As Grice tells the story, A is standing by an obviously immobilized car and is approached by B. The following exchange takes place:
A: I am out of gasoline.
B: There is a gas station around the corner.
(I have substituted the words "gasoline" and "gas station" for Grice's words "petrol" and "garage".) As Grice explains it, "B would be infringing the maxim 'Be relevant' unless he there, it is worth his effort to check it out. His reason would be just the same if in the moonlight he could faintly make out a darkened gas station sign off in the distance.
Perhaps there is some tendency to think about the case as follows: If B had not wished to be cooperative, he might have said "There is a gas station around the corner" knowing full well that it was closed. In that case, if A tries to get gas around the corner, his doing so is in some sense an error. So to avoid this error A ought to consider whether B is being cooperative and ought to infer that he can get gas around the corner only if the answer is that, yes, B is being cooperative and so thinks that the gas station is open. But this is a fallacy. If some people take a canoe trip and the dam on the river breaks, they might say afterward that it would have been helpful to check the soundness of the dam before setting out. But it does not follow that, if in fact the dam does not break, they
should nonetheless have considered whether the dam was about to break. In general, a
person cannot be expected to consider every eventuality that might have proven relevant, but only those that circumstances give the person some special reason to consider.
Participants in a conversation may indeed assume that their interlocutors are speaking cooperatively. That is, they may assume that to be so unless something special happens that ought to raise a doubt. There is a difference between assuming that the speaker is speaking cooperatively and not assuming that a speaker is speaking uncooperatively, but I do not wish to deny even that hearers may normally assume that speakers are speaking cooperatively. However, in conceding this I am conceding nothing to Grice's theory of conversational implicature. To suppose that the hearer will normally assume that the speaker speaks cooperatively is not in itself to assume that the hearer contemplates the speaker's state of mind, for to speak cooperatively is to say something relevant to the situation, and the hearer may assume that the speaker's words are relevant without making any assumptions about the speaker's state of mind. Without conceding anything to Grice, I could even grant that hearers assume that speakers intend to speak
cooperatively. An assumption about a speaker's intention is an assumption about a state of The letter does not say anything about whether the candidate is good at philosophy.
Therefore, there is some reason to doubt whether this candidate is good at philosophy." If the reader reflects on his or her inference from the fact that the letter does not say that the candidate is good at philosophy to the conclusion that there is some reason to doubt whether he is, then the reader may reason as follows: "The purpose of a letter of recommendation is to describe the candidate's qualifications for the job. Being good at philosophy is obviously a relevant qualification for a philosophy job. So the fact that the letter does not say this is some reason to think that the candidate is not." Thus, the information pertinent to the reader's goals, namely, whether Mr. X is good at philosophy, is acquired by an inference from the situation and what the speaker actually says. The pertinent feature of the situation is simply that the document is a letter of recommendation.
Accordingly, Prof. A has no reason to expect to achieve his aim in any other way.
In reply it might be said that the reasoning I have attributed to the reader requires the support of some further assumptions about the writer. If the reader is justified in assuming that this letter will do what letters of recommendation are supposed to do, then the reader wished to be cooperative and thus had described all of Mr. X 's relevant characteristics than the fact that the description of Mr. X occurred in the context of a letter of recommendation for a philosophy job. But if the facts about the contents of the letter and the conclusion that Prof. A is speaking cooperatively support the conclusion that Mr. X is no good at philosophy, and the sole basis for the conclusion that Prof. A is speaking cooperatively is that the letter is a letter of recommendation, then the conclusion that Mr. X is no good at philosophy is equally well supported by the fact that the letter is a letter of recommendation with this content quite apart from the intermediate conclusion that Prof. A is speaking cooperatively. Therefore, the reader's contemplation of what Prof. A might have had in mind given cooperativeness can typically add nothing to the force of the reader's conclusion. Borrowing a term from probability theory, we can say that the premise that the description occurs in a letter of recommendation screens off the premise that the writer is being cooperative. context, we may simply say that the proposition that the speaker intended to convey was one that the speaker intended the hearer to infer on the basis of the speaker's words and the situation. In the variant on the petrol example in the previous paragraph, the reason the communication is unsuccessful is that the conclusion that the speaker expects the hearer to draw on this basis is a conclusion that the hearer cannot in fact draw, and the reason for this is that what the speaker takes for granted about the external situation is not what the hearer takes for granted about it. In other cases, the failure may be due to the hearer's misunderstanding what the speaker literally says or due to the hearer's making a bad inference.
ACCIDENTAL SUCCESS
Without an inference to what the speaker has in mind, it might be said, any success in communication is at best accidental. Consider the following variation on the petrol example. Suppose, as in the initial version, that it is reasonable for A to reason from the external situation and what B says to the conclusion that the gas station is open and has gas to sell. But this time, suppose that B imagines that he is living in a wasteland where all the stores have gone out of business and believes that everyone he encounters knows this as well. When B says, "There is a gas station around the corner", B thinks of himself as being ironic, as if he could go on to say, "but of course you'll never get any gas there".
Not knowing this about B, A goes around the corner and buys gas. In this case, we could say that the goals of the conversation are achieved only accidentally. Although A drew a helpful conclusion, the success was accidental because A did not draw that conclusion in the right way. He either did not consider what B had in mind, or if he did consider that, he drew a conclusion about B's thought that B did not intend him to draw.
On the contrary, the reason why the success of the communication in this case is merely accidental is that the speaker did not properly perform his part in a cooperative verbal exchange. While both the hearer and the speaker share in the responsibility for So it would not be reasonable to declare an episode of communication accidental just because the reasoning of the hearer was not adequately in touch with the thought of the speaker. The reason the success is only accidental in the present variant on the petrol example is that the speaker did not properly do his part. Due to the speaker's unreasonable beliefs about the hearer, the speaker chose words from which a reasonable person would draw conclusions that the speaker did not intend the hearer to draw.
THIN SUCCESS
Success in linguistic communication comes in various thicknesses. A thick success would be success in getting the hearer to perform some overt action that the speaker intended the hearer to perform. A somewhat less thick but still not very thin success would be success in bringing the hearer to share a certain belief with the hearer. A very thin success would be merely getting the hearer to recognize that the speaker has a certain belief. The presence of a Gricean conversational implicature may seem to be clearest in cases where the only kind of success that can be claimed is very thin, and from its presence in thin cases we might infer its presence in thick cases too.
For example, suppose that Jane tells Mireille that her advertising agent has been seen with Mireille's business competitor. Jane is insinuating that Mireille's advertising agent is working for Mireille's competitor. More precisely, Jane intends to plant in
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Mireille's mind the thought that possibly the agent and the competitor are working together.
Mireille, however, knows that that is nonsense. Mireille knows that her agent and her competitor are simply friends who occasionally meet to socialize. So Jane does not have the thick success of getting Mireille to share her suspicions, but she does, we may suppose, have the thin success of getting Mireille to recognize that she, Jane, has those suspicions. How does Jane's speech act succeed in the thin sense? Perhaps Mireille asks herself, in effect, "Why is Jane saying this to me?" The answer she gives herself may be something like, "Because she thinks that what she is telling me, namely, that my agent and my competitor have been seen together, will be interesting to me, and the reason she thinks that is that she thinks it is evidence that my agent is doing advertising work for my competitor." This is not an explicit application of the principle that conversation will be cooperative in Grice's sense, but the presumption that Jane intends to say something of interest to Mireille may be construed as a corollary. So we may conclude that Mireille does in fact recognize that it is Jane's thinking that Mireille's advertising agent is working for
Mireille's competitor that explains how Jane's speech is in conformity with the Cooperative Principle.
In section 2.1 I drew a distinction between Grice's own conception of conversational implicature and a more externalistic conception. I think that the story of Jane and Mireille gives us a plausible example of conversational implicature in the externalistic sense, but not an example of conversational implicature according to Grice's own conception. It is an example of conversational implicature in the externalistic sense if, as I have allowed, Mireille recognizes Jane's suspicions on the basis of the presumption that Jane is conforming to the Cooperative Principle. However, the story of Jane and Mireille does not give us a case of conversational implicature in Grice's sense because it is not the case that Jane expects that Mireille will recognize her thought on the basis of the presumption that Jane is being cooperative. Rather, Jane expects Mireille to think that her agent may be working for her competitor on the basis of an inference from what she, Jane, 
SOURCES OF ILLUSION
The arguments for the theory of conversational implicature that I have seen never go beyond interpreting a few examples in terms of it. Since, as we have seen here, the examples are not persuasive, there must be something else that leads people to accept the theory. I think many philosophers will maintain that arguments really are not necessary because it is just intuitively obvious that there is such a thing as conversational implicature
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and the only problem is to define it. But I think this intuition is at best a natural illusion. In this section, I will identify and criticize several possible sources of this illusion.
"WHAT WAS MEANT"
Many times hearers find themselves unable to see the relevance of what a speaker literally says. They cannot perceive its relevance even after taking into account the situation in which it takes place. In that case, they may request a clarification. These requests for clarification may take various forms. The hearer might ask the speaker, "What do you mean?" or "What are you trying to say?" or even "What do you have in mind?" In some cases, the hearer may locate the failure to understand in some particular feature of the speaker's utterance, and in that case the hearer might ask a question like, "What do you mean by unwilling?" or "Who were you referring to when you said everyone?"
Thus our requests for clarification, in view of the words used in formulating them, seem to inquire into the speaker's state of mind. Even when we make our requests using words like "mean" or "refer" we are usually not talking about a feature of the speaker's utterance but about the speaker's act of uttering it, as if we were seeking an account of its motivation. In view of this, it is certainly natural-one could say, common sense-to think that when hearers need no such clarifications, that is because they already have the answers to such questions. They already know the propositional content that the speaker intends the hearer to grasp. And when a speaker communicates more than he or she broken down. The aim of these requests is to set the conversation back on track, to get the speaker to start over and this time say something more helpful. The way to do this is to ask the speaker to reflect on what he or she is trying to achieve and in that way to find a more effective means of achieving it, and that is why our requests for clarification may take the form of requests to the speaker to reflect on his or her intentions in speaking. Where communication proceeds smoothly, without the hearer's having to intervene in any way in the speaker's choice of words, the hearer need not thus inquire into the speaker's state of mind in speaking (specifically, into whether the speaker had it in mind that q, where the proposition that q is what the speaker is supposed to have meant).
We should not expect our ordinary ways of talking about language to reveal the basic concepts that we should employ in a viable theory of how language works. So the fact that our ordinary talk about language is talk about what people mean by what they say
should not all by itself persuade us that a theory of language must take the form of an account of meaning something by something. It is not unreasonable, in developing a theory, to start with common sense, but we should never be especially confident that common sense is a good source for theory or that we have understood what common sense seems to say.
MEANING AND RESPONSIBILITY
Aside from these ordinary uses of the "means" locution, there is a more philosophical usage. For each of the conclusions that may be drawn from an act of speech, a philosopher may ask, "Is that part of what the speaker meant?" The presumption is that there is a special relation of meaning between a speaker and a proposition that we ought to try to define. One motive for thinking this is the wish to appeal to such a relation in distinguishing between those propositions toward which the speaker has a special responsibility as a result of speaking and those toward which the speaker has no such responsibility. A speaker's special responsibility toward a proposition may include the conversational implicature might play a role in identifying that core of the responsibilities that a speaker acquires through speaking. But even supposing that conversational implicature in Grice's sense were a common occurrence, we could not maintain that the only conclusions a speaker might intend his or her hearer to draw on the basis of his or her act of speech would be those that the speaker intended the hearer to recognize either as literal meanings or as conversational implicatures. For instance, from the fact that someone is talking to me on the telephone at 6:00 p.m. I might infer that she is working late, and she might intend me to draw that conclusion and bear responsibility for my drawing that conclusion, but that she is working late is neither a literal meaning nor a conversational Conversational Implicature 6/5/00 Page 34 implicature of her act. So it is doubtful whether there is any special role for the concept of conversational implicature to play in defining speaker responsibility.
Suppose nonetheless that some special role in defining speaker responsibility is identified for the sorts of content that are deemed conversational implicatures in the usual sorts of examples. Suppose, for instance, that in the petrol example the proposition that the gas station around the corner is open and has gas to sell is one of a class of contents that occupies a special place in our theory of speaker responsibility. Even then it is not obvious that the best way to identify this class of contents would be in terms of the concept of conversational implicature. Instead we might identify those contents as conclusions that the speaker intends the hearer to draw on the basis of what the speaker literally says and the other features of the situation that the speaker expects the hearer to be aware of.
INTERPRETATION AS EXPLANATION
I have argued that in purported cases of conversational implicature it is not necessary for the hearer to consider whether the speaker thinks that q, where q is the content that is supposedly conversationally implicated; it is sufficient for the hearer to make an inference from the external situation and what the speaker says. Against this it may be said that I am expecting the hearer to proceed blindly, that is, to act without considering the speaker's motivation in speaking or, more generally, the causes of his or her speech. An act of speech, it may be said, can have the intended effect on a hearer only insofar as the hearer treats it as evidence for something-only insofar as the hearer can infer from its occurrence that certain other events, its causes, must have occurred as well.
Taken in one way, the idea that hearers can normally explain the speaker's act of speech is wrong, but taken in another way it is right. It is wrong if the idea is that a speaker, in choosing his or her words, has a conception of a state of mind that he or she wishes to produce in the hearer and designs a sentence that, as a consequence of the thought processes he or she expects to take place in the hearer, will produce that state of Conversational Implicature 6/5/00 Page 35 mind and that in order to understand the speaker the hearer must reconstruct this deliberation on the part of the speaker. It is an exaggeration to say that the hearer must normally interpret blindly; certainly interpretation involves the application of some kind of knowledge of language that pairs utterances in context with effects. Still, the hearer must normally interpret without reconstructing any such plan on the part of the speaker. If the hearer tried to infer the speaker's state of mind in this way and the speaker tried to plan his or her speech with a view to the hearer's reconstruction of the speaker's plan, and neither proceeded at any stage blindly, then each would be consumed in an infinite regress, as I will now show.
Let us consider how this happens just from the hearer's point of view. The way in which the speaker falls into regress will be analogous. According to our hypothesis, the hearer presumes that the speaker's choice of words is part of a plan to produce a certain mental state in the hearer, and the speaker designs his or her act of speech with a view to the hearer's reconstruction of the speaker's plan. Thus the hearer, in working out the speaker's plan, will have to consider the speaker's expectations regarding the hearer's reconstruction of the speaker's thought process. But the speaker knows this, and so, in working out the hearer's reconstruction of the speaker's plan, will have to consider the hearer's expectations regarding the speaker's expectations regarding the hearer's reconstruction of the speaker's plan. But the hearer knows this, and so, in working out the speaker's plan, will have to consider the speaker's expectations regarding the hearer's expectations regarding the speaker's expectations regarding the hearer's reconstruction of the speaker's plan. And so on. Thus the hearer can never work out the speaker's plan, because no such bottomless series of conditions can be fulfilled.
Nonetheless, the idea that hearers can normally explain speakers' acts of speech is right if the idea is just that hearers can normally presume that speakers have a conception of the goals of the conversation and speak as they do in order to promote the achievement of those goals. While a competent speaker must have the ability to speak in a way that will Conversational Implicature 6/5/00 Page 36 often promote the achievement of the goals of the conversation, a speaker does not normally have any conception of how his or her words will do that, and a hearer does not normally ascribe any such conception to a speaker. A choice of words will be a good choice if it enables the hearer, by means of an inference from the external situation and what is literally said, to do his or her part toward the achievement of the goals of the conversation. It is not necessary for a speaker to be aware of, or even to reason unawares from, such a criterion so long as he or she does in fact operate more or less in accordance with it. Consequently, it would not normally be correct for the hearer to suppose that the speaker spoke as he or she did as a result of reasoning from such a criterion. Taken in the right way, then, the idea that the hearer can explain the speaker's act of speech does not support the notion that the hearer's understanding of an act of speech is a result of his or her discerning its underlying motivation.
This is not to deny that in special cases, the hearer may become aware that something has gone wrong in a discourse and seek a more specific explanation of the speaker's act of speech. In particular, if the hearer is unable to infer anything relevant from the external situation and the speaker's act of speech, then the hearer may try to figure out what misunderstanding or ulterior motives might have led the speaker to speak as he or she did. But as I have already observed in section 5.1, from the fact that a hearer may seek a special explanation of the speaker's act of speech in cases of miscommunication, we ought not to infer that hearers regularly seek a special explanation of the speaker's act of speech even when communication goes smoothly; and even in those cases where the hearer does seek an explanation, the hearer need not attribute to the speaker intentions of the sort that Grice describes.
IMPLICATIONS FOR LITERAL MEANING
The theory of conversational implicature may serve as a model for a theory of literal meaning. As defined, the concept of conversational implicature rests on the concept of X " (1989, 218) .) Thus, literal meaning might be conceived as arising from a process in which such indirect means of meaning something become conventionalized in some sense. In this way, one might conclude that for Grice conversational implicature was really the paradigm of meaning.
Even if one does not build a theory of the literal meanings of words on the example of conversational implicature in this way, there is another way in which a theory of literal meaning might be made to rest on the concept of conversational implicature. As I noted in section 2.1, very few utterances of sentences can be interpreted apart from the situation in which they occur. In order to interpret an utterance as expressing a particular proposition-the one "literally" expressed, it is necessary to consider it in light of the situation. The process by which this is done may be, and has been, conceived on analogy with the identification of conversational implicatures Wilson 1995, Bach 1994) . Speakers are supposed to intend their hearers to grasp a certain proposition on the basis of the speaker's choice of words and the situation. The speaker's intention is itself an element of the situation and, one might say, it is the primary element of the situation to which the hearer has to attend in working out the proposition literally expressed. the rationale that they offer for the reformulation is not that the reference speaker's intentions was otiose, and they do not in any other way signal such a major change in outlook.
2.
For my own position on this, see my 1994, especially chapter 2.
3.
What I am calling the external situation must not be identified with what might called the context of utterance, which is a parameter in semantic evaluation. For example, in deciding whether a sentence such as "Everyone is present" is true, we have to consider the contextually determined domain of discourse and the contextually determined referent of "present".
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